Gender discrimination is addressed differently under Article 14 ECHR and EU primary and secondary legal provisions. This is no wonder, since the role and scope of non-discrimination law in both legal orders are not the same, and since the scope of jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice applying those provisions differ drastically as well. While this observation is not new, the potential discrepancy between the two non-discrimination regimes and the two Court's case law constitutes an increasing concern for national authorities and individuals in the 27 European Union (EU) Member States. As a result, gender discrimination is one of the many facets of the current human rights competition raging between the two European organisations, but also of the recent judicial attempts at minimising potential conflicts through mutual borrowings. The present article starts by identifying and comparing the role and scope, as well as the various material and procedural constitutive elements of the two regimes of non-discrimination on grounds of gender. The author argues for a greater systematisation of the two regimes before fruitful borrowings can take place or else the latter will jeopardise the overall coherence of the law on gender discrimination and the specificities in each of the two regimes. The article also argues that EU accession to the ECHR will not, as it is often argued, threaten the specificity of EU antidiscrimination law, but on the contrary enhance the complementarity between EU social law and European human rights law more generally.
Introduction
Ever since the European Union (EU) started developing fundamental rights guarantees and protection mechanisms, 1 the relationship between the latter and the Council of Europe's own guarantees in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) has become an increasing concern in the European construction. The recent creation of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency has spurred the controversy even further by threatening the delicate post-war division of labour between the two regional organisations. 2 The conditions in which European human rights guarantees compete and may conflict are well-known. 3 It is not only when both the ECHR and EU law apply in a given EU Member State, but also when ECHR rights apply in EU law as (indirect) source of EU fundamental rights, that the question of the coherence of the human rights requirements made by both legal orders arises. The requirements may differ per se, but will in any case often be interpreted differently by the two European courts in charge of their implementation: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The non-discrimination principle is no exception in this respect. Both EU law and the ECHR now entail a guarantee of the principle of non-discrimination qua human right 4 and both European Courts have developed an important practice relative to those guarantees. This is also the case with respect to gender discrimination. 5 The difficulty arises from the discrepancy between the two regimes of non-discrimination, both in their fundamental role and aims and in their judicial interpretation. This constitutes a problem mostly for individuals who can receive contradictory judgments from both Courts 6 and for national authorities and courts that are submitted to contradictory requirements or to the same requirements albeit interpreted differently by both Courts, but also increasingly for the ECJ and the ECtHR when they have regard for each other's law. Of course, both European legal orders have recently found ways to prevent human rights conflicts. A comparative dialogue was launched between the two courts. 7 The ECtHR has stated that it would in principle presume EU law to be providing a level of protection equivalent to that of the ECHR 8 and it often borrows definitions from the ECJ's case law. 9 Similarly, the ECJ has shown willingness to abide by the ECtHR's interpretation of the ECHR although the EU has not ratified the Convention'° and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights foresees that its guarantees ought to be interpreted in conformity with the corresponding guarantees of the ECHR (Article 52(3)).11 Signs of dialogue can also be observed in the context of gender discrimination, where both Courts have started to borrow from each other's case law, 12 albeit very unsystematically and without theorising those borrowings at all. 13 Whether this constructive dialogue should be encouraged in the long run will be taken for granted in this article.
14 It is its feasibility, rather, that will be of concern. Both the Convention-compliant interpretation of Charter rights and the ECtHR's equivalence test assume that human rights can be identified, pigeonholed and matched with each other very easily. Human rights practice shows, however, that the same rights are never guaranteed quite in the same way and that the nature and scope of the jurisdiction of the Courts in charge matters a lot when interpreting them. Thus, even though gender discrimination is prohibited per se under both legal orders, its guarantees and their constitutive material and procedural elements vary to such an extent that it is often difficult to compare them efficiently and thus to interpret them in mutually compliant ways. If such a comparison is to be made possible at all and interpretive convergence is to be furthered, the constitutive elements of both regimes first need to be identified and this is the present article's primary aim. Once this has been done, the next question to address is the possibility of promoting their mutual influence without thereby threatening the overall coherence of the two legal regimes of non-discrimination. Accordingly, the article's argument will be three-pronged. After a section on the principle of nondiscrimination in general and its guarantees in the two European legal orders, a second section identifies and compares the prohibitions of genderbased discrimination and their constitutive elements. The final section ventures two proposals for reform.
From a methodological perspective, comparing national constitutional guarantees is not easy This has to do with the difficult questions of legitimacy and sovereignty comparative law raises, but also with the greater diversity of regimes one encounters in public law than in private law. Comparing the constitutional guarantees 5 of two international organisations and/or courts is even more problematic, not the least because of the importance of national law in their conception and implementation. And this even more so since one of them, the EU, is a supranational entity whose legal order is autonomous and binds national law with absolute primacy and direct effect, whereas the other legal order, that of the ECHR, is of inter-governmental nature and follows general international law rules pertaining to the validity, primacy and effect of its norms on national law. 16 Further, while the ECHR is exclusively a human rights instrument and the ECtHR a specialised human rights court, EU law includes fundamental rights in a broader material legal order and the ECJ is vested with a generalist jurisdiction over EU law. Finally, while the nondiscrimination principle, and especially that of gender discrimination, lies at the core of the EU legal order, the ECHR only protects against gender discrimination as one among many grounds of discrimination. Both orders have in common, however, that they have put in place two of the most incisive regional international courts and that those courts' case law have gradually constituted those two orders in more than 50 years. As such, these two bodies of international case law have a lot in common structurally. Moreover, there is an overlap in the jurisdiction of both their courts since the 27 EU Member States are among the 47 Contracting Parties of the ECHR, thus providing a common public law background to the constitutional comparative exercise. Finally, the recent dialogue launched between the two Courts is the expression of a conscious rapprochement between both sets of European guarantees that has been at work for a long time, thus alleviating some of the legitimacy concerns presented here.
In this article, both legal orders are compared directly and in an integrated fashion rather than presented in turn and then compared. Surprisingly, both Courts have generally avoided theorising and systematizing their respective anti-discrimination regimes, thus rendering this integrated comparison difficult. A choice of constitutive elements from both or either regimes had to be made therefore in order to assess their treatment by both legal orders. Interestingly, the two Courts do not only borrow from each others' case law, but also borrow, sometimes very discretely and generally unsystematically from other legal orders and in particular from the US Supreme Court's case law on discrimination. 17 This comparison within the comparison is therefore also highlighted in the article. two Courts' case law on their respective guarantees of the non-discrimination principle. 18 Since gender discrimination is regulated by an important amount of primary and secondary norms in EU law, however, anti-discrimination legislation also needs to be included in the comparative material.
The Principle of Non-discrimination in General
To understand how gender discrimination is regulated under EU and ECHR law, it is important to start by examining the principle of non-discrimination in general in both legal orders. 1 9 That principle ought to be distinguished from the principle of equality, before its definition and role can be assessed in the respective legal orders.
A The Principle of Equality
The first question to arise when studying the principle of non-discrimination in a given legal order is its relationship to the principle of equality. 20 Generally speaking, equality and non-discrimination are positive and negative statements of the same principle. One is treated equally when one is not discriminated against and one is discriminated against when one is not treated equally. Whereas traditional international law used not to concern itself with discrimination, except in relation to sovereignty, the Second World War triggered an unprecedented concern for human rights protection and led to guaranteeing them for all without discrimination. From the 1950s onwards, conventional guarantees of the non-discrimination principle multiplied. The principle of non-discrimination is now one of the most frequently protected norms of international human rights law.
2 1 It is rarer, however, to find international legal guarantees of the principle of equality before and in the law. 2 2 Both the ECHR and EU law diverge in this respect.
18 Of course, the ECJ might also be called to apply Article 14 ECHR qua indirect source of EU fundamental rights. For the sake of clarity, however, the case law of both Courts will only be studied with respect to the interpretation of their respective principles of non-discrimination. EU law has always entailed both a general principle of equality before and in the law and a general principle of non-discrimination as two faces of the same coin. 23 The EU fundamental principle of equality, that is a nonwritten and general principle of EU law, finds many further expressions qua non-discrimination principle(s) in primary and secondary EU law. 24 This is the case, for instance, in the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 12 Treaty establishing the European Community (EC)) or the principle of equal pay for equal work (Article 141 EC). It has recently been guaranteed expressly, however, in a quasi-constitutional manner in Article 20 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, while Article 21 EU Charter protects the principle of non-discrimination. 25 The complementarity and interchangeability between the principles of equality and non-discrimination in EU law have been confirmed in the case of the prohibition of gender discrimination, which is defined by Article 2(1) Directive 76/207/EEC as follows: 'the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status'. In any case, the relationship between equality and nondiscrimination remains ambiguous in EU law to the extent that, in the absence of a specific principle of non-discrimination, the principle of equality could not until recently be invoked directly in a case of discrimination. The explanation for this divergence may be found in the fundamental difference in nature between both legal orders. The EU legal order is autonomous and has already been constitutionalised in many respects, thus calling for the entrenchment of a strong equality protection clause (Article 20 EU Charter) besides its many non-discrimination principles. In contrast, the ECHR remains a minimal catalogue of fundamental rights whose exercise should be guaranteed in a non-discriminatory way; in those circumstances, Article 14 is thought of as minimal and subsidiary to national constitutional equal protection clauses (see Article 53 ECHR).
B. The Principle of Non-discrimination
Although non-discrimination is a dominant and recurrent theme of international human rights law, the principle is never defined in a single and uniform fashion in the different sources of international law. Nor do most of its guarantees provide a definition of its scope. 31 Unsurprisingly. therefore, the ECHR and EU law diverge with respect to both the definition and the role they give to the non-discrimination principle.
Article 14 ECHR does not create an additional right not to be discriminated, but merely a principle that applies when the case at hand falls within the ambit of other rights in the Convention ('accessory' character of the principle). 33 Although these rights need not be violated for Article 14 ECHR to be invoked ('autonomy' of the principle), its violation will not be examined by the In contrast, the principle of non-discrimination constitutes a leitmotiv in EU law. 37 It lies at the core of the EU legal order and may, in its various concretisations, be invoked directly and autonomously both before national and European authorities. The principle of non-discrimination is a general principle of EU law that is non-written and was identified very early in the ECJ's case law. 38 The principle has been concretised in primary and secondary law and it is through these multiple specific guarantees of the principle of nondiscrimination that it applies directly in national and EU law. 39 Among its primary law guarantees, one should mention the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 12 EC; further concretised in Articles 24, 39, 42 and 49 EC) or the principle of equal pay for equal work (Article 141 EC). Since 2000, Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights protects the principle of non-discrimination, although this provision like the rest of the Charter remains non-binding despite its quasi-constitutional ambit. Article 13 EC, which was introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998, constitutes the legal basis for the adoption of further secondary law prohibiting discrimination on different grounds and in different areas of EU law. 40 Gender discrimination 1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
at work and in services constitutes one of the areas where most directives have been adopted since the 1970s, as we will see. One should also mention, however, the two general Directives adopted in 2000 on the basis of Article 13 EC:
41 the framework Directive 2000/78/EC on discrimination (on any ground) in the context of employment and occupation 42 and the Directive 2000/43/EC prohibiting discrimination on grounds of ethnic or racial origin. 43 The two directives have contributed to extending the non-discrimination principle to new grounds beyond nationality and sex and to new areas beyond employment and occupation. One may also regard this development as evidence of the progressive constitutionalisation of the principle in EU law.
As a result, while Article 14 ECHR has only been regarded as violated in 20 decisions since 1968, the ECJ's case law entails countless decisions finding a breach of the non-discrimination principle. This difference may be explained by reference to the fundamental aims of both legal orders. Whereas the ECHR was meant to create a minimal catalogue of fundamental rights, the European legal order purported to create and sustain an internal market in which people could move and settle freely without discrimination of any kind. Of course, the justifications for the non-discrimination principle were mostly economic at first. The principle had as a primary aim to protect migrant workers and service providers against discrimination on grounds of nationality and this explains the central place of Article 12 in the EC Treaty and in the ECJ's case law.
4 4 Gender discrimination was another form of discrimination that had to be prohibited from the very beginning under EU law, in order to prevent comparative economic advantages and social dumping among EU Member States. 45 Nowadays, however, the principle of non-discrimination has turned into a social and even a human right in EU law and has therefore been extended since the end of the 1990s to encompass further grounds of discrimination whose connection to the internal market is rather indirect (see Article 13 EC and Directives 2000/78/EC and 2000/43/EC). of the principle. This is particularly problematic in the case of EU law as the multiplicity of guarantees of the principle of non-discrimination applicable depending on the grounds of discrimination and on the area of application, on the one hand, together with the diversity of their sources in EU law and hence the variation of their impact on national law, on the other hand, make for a particularly complex and largely incoherent regime of anti-discrimination law.
The Principle of Non-discrimination on Grounds of Gender
To understand how gender discrimination is prohibited under EU and ECHR law, it is useful to start by discussing the source and role of the principle itself, before going on to study its personal and material scope, its constitutive material and procedural elements and different specific features it may have in practice.
A. Source and Role
The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of gender may, depending on the legal order, be guaranteed in many different sources, legislative or constitutional, and it may have a very different role from one legal order to the next. This difference in terms of sources and role is particularly evident from a comparison between ECHR and EU law on gender discrimination. Gender is one among the many explicit grounds of discrimination prohibited under Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12. As a result, the principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of gender is not a distinct principle in the European Convention, but merely a case of the general principle of nondiscrimination. Since that principle is still largely accessory in the Convention, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex remains a second-class guarantee under ECHR law.
4 7 Of course, the ECtHR's case law entails important cases of gender discrimination where it has developed a more detailed regime of non-discrimination on grounds of sex. complete regime of ECHR sex discrimination law and, despite a recent tendency to systematisation, the Court's casuistic approach has led to a regrettable lack of coherence overall. In EU law, gender-based discrimination is protected against by an express and specific principle of non-discrimination in primary law. As alluded to before, discrimination on grounds of sex was prohibited for economic reasons from the creation of the Common Market in 1957; it constituted an economic comparative advantage in favour of those countries with low social protection and had to be prohibited to ensure fair competition among Member States. As a result, it was prohibited expressly in the 1957 EEC Treaty, albeit quite restrictively qua principle of equal pay for equal work in Article 119 (now Article 141 EC). Rapidly, however, that principle was granted direct effect by the ECJ in its famous Defrenne II case. 49 A few years later, the principle of equality between men and women was even recognised as a general principle of EU law and more precisely as a fundamental right of EU law by the ECJ in the Defrenne III case. 50 Nowadays, equality between men and women constitutes one of the EUs goals described in Articles 2 and 3 EC. The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex is also guaranteed as such in Article 23 of the (non-binding to date) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Since the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of gender is not invocable per se, the only expression of the principle that can be applied directly at the moment is Article 141 EC.
From 1975 onwards, various directives were adopted to concretise the principle, mostly in the context of employment and occupation 51 but also, since 2004, on the basis of Article 13 EC, in the area of supply of goods and services.5 2 One of the first directives to be adopted was the Directive 76/207/EEC In comparison, the centrality of the prohibition of gender discrimination in EU law has not resulted in greater conceptual clarity in the ECJ's case law and does not guarantee a more systematic approach to violations than in the ECtHR's. On the contrary, the multiplicity of principles of non-discrimination and matching regimes depending on the ground of discrimination 5 7 has given rise to many discrepancies that are not always acknowledged or explained by the Court. The same applies to the principle of gender discrimination that has many sources and accordingly many personal and material scopes. 58 This multiplicity of regimes is reflected in the impact of the different principles on national law. For instance, for a long time, to be able to invoke the principle of equality between men and women directly, men and women had to invoke the equal pay principle (Article 141 EC) and prove that their case was a case of equal pay for equal work. 5 9 Other discrepancies exist relative to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of gender's material and personal scope depending on its specific sources.
B. Scope
The personal scope of a principle refers to the group of its beneficiaries and addressees, while its material scope relates to its domains of application. 
C. Material Constitutive Elements
Broadly speaking, the principle of non-discrimination precludes treating differently similar situations and treating equally different situations unless this differential treatment is objectively justified. While both European principles of non-discrimination on grounds of sex could fit this general definition, important variations arise inside each of the constitutive material elements of a discrimination. In a nutshell, the latter are: (i) an unfavourable treatment (ii) of comparable cases (iii) based on a prohibited ground of discrimination (iv) that cannot be objectively justified. According to the ECtHR, Article 14 of the Convention not only requires that persons in a similar situation must be treated in an equal manner but also requires that persons whose situations are significantly different must be treated differently.' 65 This is also what applies in EU law. According to the ECJ, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and mutatis mutandis that of non-discrimination on grounds of sex require that persons in a similar situation must be treated in an equal manner, but also that persons whose situations are significantly different must be treated differently 66 The unfavourable treatment can be overt or direct when it is openly founded on gender or covert or indirect, when it is founded on a neutral criterion (same burden in law), but which results in having a greater impact on those of one sex than the other (different burden in fact). This distinction was first made by the ECJ in its case law and has become a fundamental distinction in EU anti-discrimination law and especially in gender non-discrimination law. 68 Examples abound in the ECJ's case law. A frequent case of prohibited direct discrimination is discrimination on grounds of pregnancy 69 , while a common case of precluded indirect discrimination is the less advantageous treatment in terms of pay, further training rights or pension schemes of part-time workers who happen to be mostly women.
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The ECJ has opted for different definitions of indirect discrimination depending on the ground. In the context of discrimination based on nationality, the Court used to require evidence of a real disadvantage of the allegedly discriminatory measure on non-nationals 71 and has recently considered that there could be indirect discrimination in case of mere liability of disadvantage for a higher proportion of non-nationals. 72 In the context of gender discrimination, the ECJ has chosen yet another definition, since it equates indirect discrimination with the impact on a considerably higher proportion of women or men. (a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1; (b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons unless: (i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary, or (ii) as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer or any person or organisation to whom this Directive applies, is obliged, under national legislation, to take appropriate measures in line with the principles contained in Article 5 in order to eliminate disadvantages entailed by such provision, criterion or practice. (emphasis added) 77 Article 2(2) Directive 76/207/EEC reads:
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply: -direct discrimination: where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, -indirect discrimination: where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.... (a) "direct discrimination": where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation; (b) "indirect discrimination" where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. (emphasis added) 79 See Martin, supra n. 5 at 210, note 552 as the French and English versions differ in this respect. 80 See, for example, Martin, supra n. 5 at 113. or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, it is not excluded that this may be regarded as discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed or directed at that group.' 8 1 Generally speaking, and well before that decision, the definition of discrimination used by the ECtHR was broad and its notion of direct discrimination lato sensu could be said to encompass indirect discrimination. (ii) Comparability of cases For differential treatment to be deemed discriminatory, it needs to be treating comparable cases differently or treating non-comparable cases equally. If the cases are not comparable, the difference of treatment does not need to be justified and is not discriminatory Assessing the comparability of the situations at hand is a crucial stage; depending on the standard chosen to assess the comparability of the cases and hence on the identification of the compared groups, the situations will be deemed comparable or not, thus leading to a further enquiry or to the dismissal of the application. Both the ECJ and the ECtHR have recognised the importance of the comparability phase, but both also often tend to elude it in view of its difficulty in practice.
Under EU gender discrimination law, the comparability is an important condition of discrimination. The ECJ is usually more willing to test the comparability of the situations at hand in cases of gender discrimination than of discrimination on other grounds. 8 3 Even in equal pay cases, however, where comparability is regarded as essential, 4 the ECJ does not provide a very precise definition of the notion of comparability and its test is not always very strict.
8 5 The Grant case, for instance, has shown the latter's limits; in that case, the ECJ compared the situation of a lesbian woman to that of a homosexual man and concluded the absence of discrimination 8 6 In contrast, the ECtHR almost systematically postpones the assessment of comparability of the situations at hand to the justification phase. 8 'The Court does not consider that it has to resolve this issue, especially as the positions and interests referred to are also of relevance in determining whether the difference of treatment was justified. It will proceed on the assumption that the difference was made between persons placed in analogous situations:
a few exceptions, of course, as when the lack of comparability is used to dismiss a case. 88 However, when the Court compares the situations, its test is often reduced to a minimum. Sometimes, it even uses the measure of comparability as a justification for the differential treatment, thus undermining the whole discrimination test.
(iii) Ground of discrimination
Differential treatment of comparable cases is usually only regarded as discriminatory if the ground on which the differential treatment is based constitutes a prohibited ground of discrimination. What constitutes such a ground varies between Article 14 ECHR and EU law.
Under Article 14 ECHR, the grounds mentioned are only exemplary and any characteristic related to one's personality or one's given personal features may be regarded as a prohibited ground of discrimination. 90 97 The Court refused, however, to extend its reasoning to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in the Grant case. 98 Nowadays, sexual orientation is prohibited as a self-standing ground of discrimination without having to be attached to gender (Article 13 EC, Article 21 EU Charter and Article 1 Directive 2000/78/EC). 99 In contrast to the ECtHR's case law, there are no grounds that are deemed more suspect than others under EU law. In principle, all prohibited grounds of discrimination should give rise to the same level of scrutiny by the ECJ. There are, however, variations between the tests used in cases of discrimination on grounds of nationality and sex discrimination and they demonstrate the higher protection granted to nationality; one may mention in this respect the kind of evidence required or the scope of the margin of appreciation allowed to Member States. 100 Moreover, the ECJ seems to have introduced some kind of hierarchy in its recent case law relative to Directive 2000/78/EC. In the Mangold case, for instance, the test applied to age discrimination reflects a higher level of scrutiny than the test that would be applied to a similar case of sex discrimination. 1 0 1 Of course, the largely pragmatic and casuistic nature of the ECJ's approach in those matters makes it difficult to draw any general and definitive conclusion as to the existence of a hierarchy of grounds of discrimination in the current state of EU law.
2 (iv) Justifications
A differential treatment of comparable cases on prohibited grounds is only discriminatory when it cannot be justified by objective reasons. Some guarantees of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of gender do not allow for justified restrictions, however. This divergence of approaches can be found between Article 14 ECHR and EU law. Although Article 14 ECHR does not expressly foresee the possibility of justified restrictions, the ECtHR's case law allows for objective and reasonable justifications to be provided. According to the ECtHR, 'a distinction is discriminatory, for the purposes of Article 14, if it "has no objective and reasonable justification", that is if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" or if there is no "reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised"'.*103 Accordingly, the two conditions for the justification of a prima facie discrimination are: (i) a legitimate aim and (ii) proportionality between that aim and the means employed. The test also applies to gender discrimination. 10 4 The case law has not developed a precise test of what a legitimate aim should be and it amounts at the most to a test of reasonableness. Moreover, the Court often conflates the assessment of the legitimate aim with the proportionality test.
1 0 5 Justifications may be provided both in cases of direct and indirect gender discrimination. EU law distinguishes between the justification of direct and indirect gender discrimination. Whereas indirect discrimination on grounds of sex may be justified, it is never the case for direct sex discrimination.
10 7 In this sense, gender is treated differently from other grounds and especially from nationality since both cases of direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality may be justified.' 0 Recently, however, doubts have started arising in light of the justification clause of Article 2(5) Directive 2000/78/EC. Although the framework directive applies to all grounds of discrimination prohibited by EU law, and this may explain its broad justification clause, it may be interpreted to mean that gender discrimination can be justified like discrimination on any other ground. 1 0 9 Indirect gender discrimination may be justified by objective grounds unrelated to sex provided they are proportionally related to the means chosen. 110 According to the ECJ in the Bilka case, this is the case when 'the means chosen [...] correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view to achieving the objective in question and are necessary to that end'. 11 On the model of the American Civil Rights Act 1964's notion of 'bona-fide-occupational-qualification', these objective grounds encompass economic and non-economic grounds provided they are not sex-related. The ECJ is traditionally very generous in granting those grounds, especially when Member States' or the European Community's social policies are at stake.
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Under the ECHR, when the ground of discrimination is a suspect one, it is more difficult to justify a discriminatory measure. Because sex is a suspect ground under Convention law only, the two regimes differ in this respect. Since gender is a suspect ground of discrimination under Article 14 ECHR, the Contracting Parties are required to provide 'very weighty reasons' for the differential treatment to be justified.
1 3 This is also the case for prima facie discriminations founded on sexual orientation."discrimination. The reasons provided need not be weightier or less weighty than in other cases. In view of the recent case law pertaining to age and disability under the Directive 2000/78/EC, 11 6 however, age and disability discrimination seem to be submitted to a stronger proportionality requirement than other grounds of discrimination. This might indicate that the justifications required for gender-based discrimination are less stringent. The largely pragmatic and casuistic nature of the ECJ's approach in those matters, however, makes it difficult to draw any general rule as to the development of a differentiated regime of justification.
D. Procedural Constitutive Elements
The procedural dimension of the ECHR and EU anti-discrimination regimes reflect the fundamentally different role and approach of the two European Courts. There are three procedural elements that come out of both regimes and reflect those differences: evidence and burden of proof, level of scrutiny and margin of appreciation.
(i) Evidence and burden of proof
The issue of the evidence of discrimination amounts to the degree and the way in which the allegation, of an unjustified differential treatment of comparable cases on the grounds of sex, needs to be substantiated. Closely connected to this question, the issue of the burden of proof has been at the core of the development of gender discrimination law in Europe since the beginning, as applicants are often hindered by the difficulty there is to provide evidence of gender discrimination in certain cases.
The ECJ adopts a nuanced approach to evidence issues. In case of direct discrimination, the Court does not require evidence of a discriminatory intent. Evidence of an explicit discrimination is sufficient. In case of indirect discrimination, the ECJ was very innovative from the beginning. While it required that the likelihood of disadvantage for the applicant be proven in cases of discrimination based on nationality 11 7 and, more recently, that at least the liability of disadvantage for a higher proportion of non-nationals be proven 1 , it has adopted a different approach in cases of indirect gender discrimination; there, what is required is evidence of impact on a substantially higher number of women or men. 1 9 This may be provided by statistical evidence, on the model of what applies to private discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 in the United States.' 20 It is unclear at the moment whether the slightly different wording chosen to define indirect discrimination in Directive 97/80/EC and the revised version of Article 2(2) Directive 76/207/EEC will have any impact on the kind of evidence to be produced. Whereas it is clear that the evidence of a substantially higher impact need no longer be brought, the applicant should provide evidence of the reality of the disadvantage and not only of its likelihood.
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Of course, the possibility of bringing statistical evidence of a considerable impact on those of one sex is not necessarily easy.
122 To prevent evidence from becoming an insurmountable hurdle for discrimination victims, the ECJ quickly allowed the burden of proof to shift once a prima facie case of discrimination has been made. 123 This practice relative to the evidence of indirect discrimination was codified in Article 4 of the Burden of Proof Directive 97/80/ EC, which has now become Article 19 Directive 2006/54/EC.' 24 In any case, it remains a matter for the relevant national body to appreciate the facts from which to presume that there is a case of direct or indirect discrimination.
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Under Article 14 ECHR, in contrast, the degree of evidence to be provided is high. In principle, the ECtHR requires evidence of the discriminatory intent. In certain exceptional cases, the Court is satisfied with mere evidence of explicit discrimination, but the case should be made 'beyond any reasonable doubt'. 126 There are no accommodations made in the case of direct gender discrimination and the burden of proof does not shift to the State once the proof of the likelihood of discrimination has been provided. In principle, the same applies to the evidence of indirect discrimination. 127 In a recent case, however, the European Court changed its practice following the ECJ's case law. Accordingly, the applicant only needs to prove 'the disproportionately prejudicial effect on a particular group' 128 Evidence of such a disproportionately prejudicial effect may be provided by undisputed official statistical evidence, as confirmed in the Hoogendijk case. 129 It is only once statistical evidence has been provided, however, that the burden of proof of objective justifications can shift to the State. The ECtHR has not yet organised a specific accommodation of the burden of proof in cases of direct gender discrimination based on the model of the EU burden of proof directive.
(ii) Level of scrutiny
Once a prima facie case of discrimination has been made by the applicant, the court needs to assess whether the differential treatment can be justified. The courts can apply different levels of scrutiny that will match the weight that the justifications should have and the degree of proportionality that should be respected.
The ECJ and the ECtHR diverge a lot on this subject. The ECtHR distinguishes, as we saw previously, between ordinary and suspect grounds of discrimination. Gender is classified among the latter and calls therefore for a heightened degree of scrutiny on the part of the Court. The Court requires 'very weighty reasons' for a differential treatment on grounds of sex to be justified and the proportionality test is also more demanding in such a case.
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The ECJ, in contrast, does not distinguish, in its case law, between different grounds of discrimination and applies prima facie the same level of scrutiny to cases of gender discrimination as to discrimination on any other ground. As discussed before, however, the ECJ's recent practice reveals variations between the tests used in cases of discrimination on grounds of nationality The Court considers that where an applicant is able to show. on the basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a specific rule -although formulated in a neutral manner -in fact affects a clearly higher percentage of women than men, it is for the respondent Government to show that this is the result of objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. If the onus of demonstrating that a difference in impact for men and women is not in practice discriminatory does not shift to the respondent Government, it will be in practice extremely difficult for applicants to prove indirect discrimination. and sex discrimination. 131 Moreover, the ECJ has applied a stricter test of proportionality in a recent case of age discrimination. 132 In the Mangold case, the ECJ required that the alleged justification be individualised to be able to be regarded as such, whereas it has never required this level of individualisation in case of gender discrimination. 133 The largely pragmatic and casuistic nature of the ECJ's approach in those matters, however, makes it difficult to draw any general conclusion as to the development of differentiated levels of scrutiny.
(iii) Margin of appreciation
Because the two regimes compared are international regimes and the two jurisdictions in charge of interpreting them are supranational, the question of the margin of appreciation granted to the Member States of the EU and to the Contracting States of the ECHR is an important one. In EU law, Member States' margin of appreciation is traditionally limited with respect to the interpretation of Community concepts and principles, and of their derogations. Interestingly, however, the ECJ has proved quite generous in granting Member States a margin of appreciation in the context of derogations from the non-discrimination principle on grounds of gender. These cases are those in which Member States invoke their exclusive competences or competences they share with the Community as in the context of social policy and contrasting social objectives.
13s However, since the prohibition of gender discrimination constitutes a fundamental right and principle of EU law, the ECJ has also been quite adamant that Member States' and Community's contrary policies should not be invoked to render the principle meaningless. 136 Under Article 14 ECHR, and many other rights in the Convention, the ECtHR recognises a broad margin of appreciation to the Convention's Contracting Parties. The explanation lies in the minimal and subsidiary nature of the Convention's guarantees and especially of the ECtHR's jurisdiction. 137 In contrast to what is the case in the EU legal order, there have been no transfers of competence under the Convention and the ECtHR cannot use the ECJ's competence-based approach to the margin of appreciation. As a result, in the context of gender discrimination, the margin of appreciation often dilutes the special protection granted to sex qua suspect classification in the ECtHR's case law. 138 One example is social policy, where the ECtHR, on the basis of the ECJ's case law, recognises that objectives in national social policy may justify differential treatment on grounds of sex. 139 Of course, the scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background; in this respect, one of the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting Parties. 140 The lack of a common ground among Contracting Parties arose in the Frett6 case, where the Court had to decide on the French refusal to allow a single homosexual man to adopt a child. The Court used the lack of common ground to reject the application, but reassuringly stated that the 'margin of appreciation should not, however, be interpreted as granting the State arbitrary power, and the authorities' decision remains subject to review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of Article 14 of the Convention.
14 1 This statement did not prevent the Court from dismissing the case, however. In effect, the Court has turned the margin of appreciation into a test of arbitrariness. This comes close to neutralizing and hence undermining the whole purpose of the heightened scrutiny applicable to suspect grounds of discrimination like gender.'
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E. Special Features
The non-discrimination principle may protect against different kinds of discrimination that themselves concretise different dimensions of equality Equality does not always require a symmetrical treatment of equal situations and asymmetrical equality, and hence discrimination can also be protected to take into account specifically female or male circumstances or objective occupational requirements. Further, equality may not only mean formal or legal equality, but also material equality, i.e. equality in terms of results. Formal equality might therefore have to be violated to ensure material equality in certain cases.
(i) Symmetrical and asymmetrical equality Equality is usually said to be symmetrical in the sense that people deemed to be in comparable situations should be treated in a comparable way and people in different situations in a different way. In certain rare cases, however, men and women might be in a comparable situation (e.g. in terms of professional qualifications), but that comparability can itself be limited in certain respects when special features or circumstances that apply only to men or only to women apply. This might be the case when pregnant women need special protection during pregnancy and shortly after giving birth and when they are treated differently from men accordingly, or when men are by virtue of their physical constitution more able to fit certain occupational requirements and are therefore treated differently from women.
In EU law, cases of asymmetrical equality are well-known and exceptionally justified despite the prima facie discrimination in favour of men or women and despite the violation of Article 2(1) Directive 76/207/EEC. Thus, Article 2(7) Directive 76/207/EEC calls for special protection of women in case of pregnancy.
14 3 This approach to asymmetrical equality is reflected by the ECJ's case law on the protection of pregnant women discriminated at work. 144 The Court is very strict, however, to prevent the need for special protection to turn into paternalism. In the Griesmar case, for instance, it distinguishes carefully between compensation for pregnancy and compensation for child care.
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Article 2(6) Directive 76/207/EEC allows, on the other hand, certain sex-based differentiations to be made by reference to genuine and determining occupational requirements.
14 6 The ECJ has decided numerous cases on that basis in the Member States may provide, as regards access to employment including the training leading thereto, that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related military context in particular, where it only upheld the exclusion of women from certain militaryor police forces where there was a genuine and determining occupational requirement and the strictest proportionality test could be respected. 14 7 Under Article 14 ECHR, equality seems to be largely understood in symmetrical terms. Certain decisions in the ECtHR's case law testify to an asymmetrical approach, however. This is the case, for instance, in the context of pregnancy and child-care 148 or of military service. 149 In this respect, one may notice a higher propensity for the Court to respect Contracting Parties' margin of appreciation when the applicants are men than women.' 50 As a result, the asymmetrical approach in the ECtHR's case law has a paternalistic and traditional flavour that is difficult to reconcile with the ECJ's decisions on similar issues. (ii) Formal and material equality There can be cases where men and women are equally situated and where there are no specific features or circumstances that require an asymmetrical treatment, but where a formal discrimination is required to redress past material or formal discriminations and hence to ensure present material equality. Affirmative or positive action measures exemplify the requirements of material equality.
Until 1995, there was little discussion of material equality and affirmative or positive action in favour of women in EU law.'
52 Since the Kalanke case, however, and the other cases that followed, the issue has become central in EU gender discrimination law. In Kalanke, the Court adopted a rigid position against the protection of equality of results and positive measures that give absolute priority to women in case of under-representation, and justified its position by reference to the principle of equality of chances as protected by Article 2(4) Directive 76/207/EEC (in its old version). 153 Following Germany's reaction and the controversy that raged shortly after the decision, the Court nuanced its position in the Marschall and Badeck cases where it accepted flexible quotas that give priority to women of equal competence albeit not in an absolute fashion, but under a saving clause that allows to take male candidates' specific circumstances into account. 
Proposals for Reform
The ECHR and EU law have very different approaches to gender discrimination and these different approaches emerge clearly from the ECtHR's and the ECJ's case law. When both regimes apply to the same facts, contradictory solutions might therefore frequently arise. Recently the two Courts have started a dialogue and mutual borrowing habits, but the latter have only been used 153 sporadically and strategically so far. 1 5 6 Moreover, concrete borrowings have had no impact on the regimes themselves and have triggered no fundamental reorganisation of the respective regimes of non-discrimination. Whereas mutual borrowings of this kind might be recommendable from a short-term perspective, it presents the risk of producing incoherent decisions both synchronically within each legal order and diachronically within and among the two legal orders. 157 Thus, while it is true that comparative constitutional law has crucial virtues in a pluralistic European legal order where convergence ought to take place gradually and be tested incrementally, 15 8 it also has its downsides when the systems which are compared and whose solutions are mutually borrowed are not sufficiently close in their aims and structures.
A long-term solution requires a two-tiered reform, where both steps need to be taken in turn and in the proposed order to ease progressive convergence without undermining autonomy and diversity. A first step would be for each Court, helped by its legislature in the case of the EU, to start theorizing and systematizing its respective gender non-discrimination regime. Once categories have become clearer and the case law less fluctuating, comparative constitutional law and mutual borrowings of the kind that started in the past few years might become more fruitful. The real normative change, however, will only come in a second stage with the EU's accession to the ECHR. Following accession, the ECHR's catalogue will be vested with the constitutional rank it ought to have in a constitutionalised legal order like the EU's and the ECtHR will become the ultimate human rights court in Europe. From the perspective of gender discrimination, accession will provide victims of gender discrimination with a more coherent and hence more efficient answer, without, however, undermining the EU's idiosyncratic anti-discrimination measures and depriving European men and women from one of the most advanced antidiscrimination law regimes.
A. Systematisation
In view of the fundamental divergences between the two regimes, it is important that both Courts and the EU legislature start theorising and systematising the gender anti-discrimination regimes in those twin European post-national legal orders. EU law now owns a recast Directive 2006/54/EC in the field of gender discrimination that will replace all previous directives by 2009 and has codified much of the ECJ's case law. Nothing signals, however, that the ECJ's case law will become less fluctuating, although it is important that it 156 See also, Martin, supra n. 5 at 132- defines clearly the material and procedural constitutive elements of the prohibition of gender discrimination and abides by those definitions. In the ECHR gender discrimination regime, on the other hand, change might stem from Protocol 12 if it is more broadly ratified, since it provides the ECHR with an independent and general equal protection clause. As of late, signs of a corresponding strengthening and systematisation of the ECtHR's approach in its case law are perceptible.
To start with, it is essential that both legal orders clarify and strengthen the relationship between the prohibition of gender discrimination and the principle of equality in general. The future constitutionalisation of the principle of equality in EU law and the progressive ratification of Protocol 12 among Contracting Parties to the ECHR confirm the need to tie gender discrimination more closely to the general principle of equality to ensure more coherence in each regime and the legal reasoning applicable. More specifically, this will ensure that EU gender discrimination law develops a coherent personal and material scope and be vested with a more systematic impact on national law without depending on the specific sources of the principle of nondiscrimination in each case.
Furthermore, it is important that gender be given a heightened protection in EU law. The ECJ's pragmatic approach has been largely beneficial in developing tailor-made solutions for gender qua ground of discrimination. This was exemplified in the context of the justification of indirect gender discrimination and by the alleviation of the burden of proof. However, based on Directive 2000/ 78/EC and the development of other prohibited grounds of discrimination in EU law, the ECJ's casuistic approach has led to increasing incoherence between the regimes applicable to different grounds of discrimination and paradoxically to the development of a hierarchy of grounds and corresponding scrutiny where gender is no longer ranked as high as it ought to be. Evidence of the high-rank gender deserves in the hierarchy of grounds of discrimination in EU law may be found in its central place in the EC Treaty since 1957, the development of secondary law since 1975 culminating in the 2004/113 and 2006/54 Directives, the place of gender equality among the EU's goals in Articles 2 and 3 EC and Article 23 EU Charter. The ECJ could benefit in this respect from the ECtHR's own classifications and experience with heightened scrutiny in the legal reasoning applicable to sex discrimination. In this respect, it is important that the ECtHR abides more systematically by the higher rank of gender qua suspect ground of classification in its own case law. For instance, it should prevent the erosion of heightened scrutiny in this context, by relinquishing its overbroad use of the margin of appreciation when arguments of social policy are made or when male applicants are concerned.
Another dimension where ECHR and EU gender discrimination law needs to be reformed is the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination.
By fine-tuning its understanding of differential treatment, the ECtHR would be able to raise the level of protection of men and women who are discriminated in covert ways by prima facie neutral requirements. In this respect, the ECtHR has already started benefiting in its most recent case law from the ECJ's nuanced distinctions and definitions.
15 9 The ECJ itself needs, however, to clarify the ambiguity among the various definitions of indirect discrimination used in the latest European directives. Further systematisation is also needed with respect to the conditions for the justification of direct and indirect discriminations. The differences between the two types of discrimination need to be reflected in the kinds of justification that can be accepted in contrast to the ECtHR's case law. The ECJ's practice can constitute an important source of inspiration in this respect, although the ECJ needs to clarify whether or not and why direct discrimination may be justified. After all, direct discrimination based on other grounds than gender is justifiable in EU law and so is direct gender discrimination under ECHR law.
A final dimension of both European regimes that needs to be systematised is evidence and the organisation of the burden of proof. While evidence and alleviating the burden of proof has been at the centre of the ECJ's case law in gender discrimination for years, a similar evolution has only just started under ECHR law. It is important that sex discrimination receives adequate procedural treatment in this respect in the ECtHR's case law. The requirement of evidence of discriminatory intent is entirely inadequate in circumstances of indirect discrimination and, even in cases of direct discrimination, the absence of ways to shift the burden of proof constitutes a severe hindrance for discriminated applicants. 160 Once those different elements are addressed more openly and consistently within each Court's case law, it is likely that their case law will offer more ready solutions for them to borrow from each other. As a result, comparative constitutional law will be able to contribute to the soft kind of harmonisation one may hope for in the human rights context in Europe. When the two systems compared are sufficiently systematised and judges aware of their similarities and differences, comparisons and free mutual borrowings in specific cases constitute one of the least sovereignty-offending means of convergence in a pluralistic European legal order lato sensu. 
B. Accession
Since the 1960s, human rights have triggered constitutionalisation of the European legal order qua constraint on European power. Recently, however, they have also turned into an irresistible albeit controversial force of constitutionalisation qua normative empowerment of European institutions. Scope precludes going into the details of the European constitutionalisation process in this article. 162 At a time when human rights are constitutionalised via the EU Charter, however, it is becoming crucial for the EU to ratify the ECHR and hence submit itself to the same human rights catalogue as its Member States. 163 New Article 6(2) EU, as amended by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, attests of the political will in favour of accession in the EU. 16 4 Moreover, recent signals on the part of the Council of Europe attest to the reciprocal interest in the EU joining the Convention following Protocol 14's amendment of the personal conditions of accession. 165 In the context of gender discrimination, accession would provide a minimal threshold in terms of anti-discrimination protection in the EU and the submission of European authorities to binding albeit subsidiary decisions of the ECtHR in discrimination cases. Despite its opponents' fear, accession can be said to offer the best of both worlds. Security and coherence should not indeed come at the price of protection and sovereignty Two main sets of arguments explain how this is possible.
On the one hand, there would be no risk of levelling-down following accession or even of denaturing the EU's more advanced gender discrimination regime. 166 The ECHR is conceived as a minimal and subsidiary catalogue of human rights. Thus, Article 53 ECHR read together with Article 52(3) EU Charter enables not only Member States but also the EU to develop higher protection mechanisms against gender discrimination. Moreover, the ECtHR's protection of the Contracting Parties' margin of appreciation that is used to accommodate Contracting Parties' social goals and policies could extend to the EU's social goals and protect its more advanced anti-discrimination policies. In fact, it follows from the review of cases presented earlier that no Contracting Party to the ECHR has ever had to lower its level of social protection against gender discrimination as a result of the ECtHR's case law, quite the reverse. Of course, the ways in which the ECtHR would be arbitrating the EU's and its Member States' policies and norms when they conflict with each other in a given case of gender discrimination remain to be seen. Given the presumption of Convention-compliance that applies since 2005 to EU law and decisions, 167 however, the ECtHR is likely to grant the EU's margin of appreciation higher protection. Finally, the benefits of systematisation and mutual borrowings between the two Courts discussed previously will gradually contribute to reducing the possibility of a levelling-down of EU guarantees. It is likely indeed that the ECtHR will strengthen its approach to gender discrimination on the basis of the ECJ's case law and Protocol 12. This could be the case in particular relative to the level of scrutiny and burden of proof of indirect discrimination.
At the same time, the fear of seeing all ECJ's judgements relative to gender discrimination being superseded by those of the ECtHR is unfounded. The latter's jurisdiction would remain subsidiary and would require exhausting local remedies in EU Member States, but also probably in Luxembourg. In fact, a preliminary ruling system might help reduce the amount of cases triggering adverse judgments by the ECtHR; it would give the ECJ a chance to scrutinise its case law, while also allowing the ECtHR to strengthen its own gender discrimination case law in conceptual terms. This is after all what took place in the EU with the mutually reinforcing exchanges between the ECJ and national courts in the framework of preliminary rulings. 168 Of course, the risk of overburdening the ECtHR should not be underestimated and needs to be factored into the current reform of the human rights monitoring system in the Council of Europe. 
Conclusion
From a comparative constitutional perspective, the sheer multiplicity of sources, scopes and contents of the guarantees of the non-discrimination principle in Europe is bewildering. Legal responses to gender discrimination are just as diverse in their sources, scope and content. non-discrimination on grounds of sex in Europe, and most particularly under Article 14 ECHR and EU primary and secondary law, mirror 50 years of intense economic development in Europe but also of steady social progress, albeit seen through different lenses. As in so many other fields, the two European Courts sing the same song, but in two different and sometimes dissonant voices. This article has tried to identify the main components of the two European gender discrimination regimes and capture their fundamental aims. Based on the divergences observed, it has made two suggestions as to how to allow more convergence without threatening the benefits of autonomy and diversity in human rights protection in Europe. These proposals should hopefully contribute to cultivating the two legal orders' common history and ensuring European legal security, without, however, betraying their respective specificities and complementarity in a complex Europe. Never shall the twain meet.
